Executive summary
It is generally said that firms in developing countries do not have incentives to invest in pollution control effort because of the weak monitoring and enforcement of the environmental regulations. This argument assumes that the environmental regulator is the only agent that can penalize the firm for a lack of pollution control effort, or reward the firm for good environmental performance or innovation in environmental technologies. It ignores that capital markets may react negatively to the announcement of adverse environmental incidents involving specific firms (such as violation of permits, spills, etc.) or positively to the announcement of greater pollution control effort such as the adoption of cleaner technologies. Hence, the inability of formal institutions in developing countries to provide incentives for pollution control effort (via the traditional channel of fines and penalties) may not be as serious an impediment to pollution control as is generally argued. Capital markets, if properly informed, may provide the appropriate financial and reputational incentives.
In this paper, we assess whether or not capital markets in Argentina, Chile, Mexico, and the Philippines react to the announcement of firm-specific environmental news. We show that capital markets react positively (increase in firms' market value) to the announcement of rewards and explicit recognition of superior environmental performance; we also show that capital markets react negatively (decrease in firms' value) to citizens' complaints. An immediate policy implication from the current analysis is that environmental regulators in developing countries may explicitly harness those market forces by introducing structured programs of information release on firms' environmental performance, and empower communities and stakeholders through environmental education programs. At the margin, less resources should be devoted to the enforcement of regulations and more to the dissemination of information which allows all stakeholders to make informed decisions.
These results may also shed some new light on the pollution haven hypothesis. A large number of studies have examined the potential impact of environmental regulations on international competitiveness. Many of these have concluded that pollution intensive firms have not invested or relocated in developing countries to benefit from lower environmental standards and/or poor enforcement of environmental regulations. Hettige et al. (1992) observes that "one possibility is that the expected profitability of investment in pollution-intensive sectors has also been affected by growing concern over legal liability or reputational damage" (p. 480). To the extent that capital markets may reward firms with good environmental performance and penalize firms with poor environmental performance, the potential reaction of capital markets may explain that the pollution haven hypothesis has so far not found empirical support.
Introduction
Though environmental regulations have now been in use for more than 20 years, it is increasingly recognised that their efficacy in controlling pollution emissions has been dampened by a lack of appropriate monitoring and enforcement. Resources devoted by various regulatory agencies to the monitoring of emission standards have typically been characterized as insufficient. 1 Moreover, when compliance with the standards is found to be lacking, it is generally acknowledged that fines and penalties are too low (compared to pollution abatement costs) to act as effective deterrents. In a recent study of environmental regulations in East
Asian countries, O'Connor (1994) writes:
In several of the countries studied here, 2 the monitoring problem is compounded by weak enforcement. In short, when violators of standards are detected, if penalised at all they often face only weak sanctions. (...) polluters are exempted from fines either on grounds of financial hardship or because the violators wield undue political influence. Perhaps the most pervasive problem is that, even when fines are levied, they are frequently so low in real terms that they have little if any deterrent value. In virtually all the countries studied, there remains considerable room for improvement on the enforcement front. (p. 94) It is indeed generally said that firms in developing countries do not have incentives to invest in pollution control effort because of weak monitoring and enforcement of the environmental regulations. This argument however assumes that the environmental regulator is the only agent that can penalise the firm lacking pollution control effort, or reward the firm for good environmental performance or innovation in environmental technologies. It ignores that capital markets may react negatively to the announcement of adverse environmental incidents (such as violation of permits, spills, court actions, complaints, etc.) or positively to the announcement of greater pollution control effort such as the adoption of cleaner technologies.
The impact of firm-specific environmental news on market value may work its way through various channels: a high level of pollution intensity may signal to investors the inefficiency of the firm's production process; it may invite stricter scrutiny by environmental groups and/or facility neighbours; it may result in the loss of reputation, goodwill, etc. On the other hand, the announcement of a good environmental performance or of the investment in cleaner technologies may have the opposite effect: lesser scrutiny by regulators and communities (including the financial community), greater access to international markets, etc. Hence, the inability of institutions in developing countries to provide incentives for pollution control effort via the traditional channel of fines and penalties may not be as serious an impediment to pollution control as is generally argued. Capital markets, if properly informed, may provide the appropriate reputational and financial incentives.
A limited number of papers have analyzed the reaction of capital markets to environmental news in Canada and the United States. These studies have generally shown that firms suffer from a decline in market values upon announcement of adverse environmental news. 4 In this paper, we assess whether or not capital markets in Mexico, 1 See Russell (1990) .
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Those being Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, and Indonesia. 3 See Porter and Van Linde (1995) and Klassen and McLaughlin (1996) for more details.
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In the United States, these studies include, among others, analysis of the reaction of markets to releases of the Toxics Release Inventory (Hamilton (1995) and Konar and Cohen (1997) ). Lanoie
Chile, Argentina, and the Philippines react to the announcement of firm-specific environmental news. To our knowledge, the current analysis is the first of this nature performed in developing countries. Even in those countries where it is generally argued that the environmental regulations suffer from poor implementation, we show that capital markets react negatively (decrease in firms' value) to citizens' complaints targeted at specific firms. We also show that markets react positively (increase in firms' market value)
to the announcement of rewards and explicit recognition of superior environmental
performance. An immediate policy implication from the current analysis is that environmental regulators in developing countries may explicitly harness those market forces by introducing structured programs of information release on firms' environmental peformance, and empower communities and stakeholders through environmental education programs.
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These results may also shed some new light on the pollution haven hypothesis. A large number of studies have examined the potential impact of environmental regulations on international competitiveness. 6 Many of these have concluded that pollution intensive firms have not invested or relocated in developing countries to benefit from lower environmental standards and/or poor enforcement of environmental regulations. Hettige et al. (1992) observes that "one possibility is that the expected profitability of investment in and Laplante (1994) analyze the reaction of capital markets to environmental news in Canada. For a survey of these studies, see Lanoie, Laplante and Roy (1997) . 5 We know of at least two such programs currently in place in developing countries: in Indonesia (PROPER Prokasih) and the Philippines (Ecowatch). Similar programs are currently being developed in Mexico and Colombia. For further details, see Afsah et al. (1996). 6 See for example, Jaffe et al. (1995) , Kolstad and Xing (1994) , Levinson (1992) , Low and Yeats (1992) , Stewart (1993) , Tobey (1990) , Walter (1992) , and Wheeler and Moddy (1992) .
pollution-intensive sectors has also been affected by growing concern over legal liability or reputational damage" (p. 480). Where traditional tools and actions may have been unable to create incentives for pollution control, our results give some support to this point of view to the extent that capital markets may reward firms with good environmental performance and penalize firms with poor environmental performance.
In the next section, we describe our dataset. In Section 3, we briefly describe the event-study methodology used in this analysis to measure the reaction of capital markets to environmental news (both positive and negative news). Results are presented in Section 4. We briefly conclude in Section 5.
Dataset
The countries retained in this study -Argentina, Chile, Mexico, and the Philippines -are countries where stock markets are believed to work reasonably well, where market capitalization is relatively high and increasing over time (Table 1) , and where market concentration is not an impediment to conducting event-study analyses (Table 2) .
Alhough market concentration may appear to be high, note that the IFC General Indexes represent only a fraction of total market capitalization. Actual market concentration is lower than suggested in Table 2 . For each country, we selected a newspaper which has a large circulation and is of particular interest to the business community. 8 Environmental news were collected in each of the countries over the period inclusively. Once these news were collected, we identified those articles involving firms traded in local capital markets. As shown in Table   8 In Environmental news were divided into two groups: positive (e.g. rewards, investment in pollution control, etc.), and negative (e.g. spills, complaints, warnings, etc.).
The sample set is described in Table 4 Table 4 is smaller than the number of news (with name of publicly traded companies) in Table 3 . This is the case since a significant number of newsclips is simply a repetition or follow-up on an initial event and does not provide any additional information to what is already known. In most cases, we have included in our dataset only the announcement of the initial event. Complete names of firms appear in Appendix 1.
III. Event-study methodology
The event-study methodology is used in this study to examine the reaction of investors to positive and negative news (also called events). 9 The methodology is based on the assumption that capital markets are sufficiently efficient to evaluate the impact of new information (events) on expected future profits of the firms. It involves the following steps: (1) identification of the events of interest and definition of the event window 10 ; (2) selection of the sample set of firms to include in the analysis; 11 (3) prediction of a "normal" return during the event window in the absence of the event; (4) estimation of the abnormal return within the event window, where the abnormal return is defined as the difference between the actual and predicted returns; and (5) The market model assumes a linear relationship between the return of any security to the return of the market portfolio:
(1) 
For more details, see MacKinlay (1997) .
10
The event window consists of the day where the event occured (day 0) and some days before and after the event.
11
Firms may be excluded if simultaneous events are occuring within the event window.
where t is the time index, i N = 1 2 , ,..., stands for security, R and R it mt are the returns on security i and the market portfolio respectively during period t , and e it is the error term for security i.
Equation (1) is generally estimated over a period which runs between 120 and 210 days prior to the event up to 10 days prior to the event. The event window is defined as the period from 10 days prior to the event to 10 days after the event. With the estimates of α β i i and from equation (1), one can predict a "normal" return during the days covered by the event window. The prediction error (the difference between the actual return and the predicted normal return), commonly referred to as the abnormal return (AR), is then calculated as:
Under the null hypothesis, the abnormal returns will be jointly normally determined with a zero conditional mean and conditional variance σ 2 ( )
where L is the estimation period length (i.e. number of days used for estimation) and R m is the mean of the market portfolio. With L large, σ σ To test for the significance of AAR t a Z (or t ) test can be derived.
In order to test for the persistence of the impact of the event during a period
− , the abnormal return can be added to obtain the cumulated abnormal returns
for security i over the period ( ) T T 2 1 − :
event window, and T a and T b are the lower and upper limits of the event window, respectively. Asymptotically (as L increases) the variance of the cumulative abnormal return for security i is
To test the null hypothesis of zero cumulative abnormal return, one can formulate
0 σ :
An aggregation of interest can also be performed across both time and events. In that scenario, the average cumulative abnormal return is defined as: Under the null hypotheses that the abnormal returns are zero,
As pointed by MacKinlay (1997, pp. 24) , this distributional result is asymptotic with respect to the number of securities N and the length of estimation window L .
In the next section, we present results obtained from using the single-index model
(constant mean return model).
12

IV. Empirical Results
We apply the event-study methodology to the environmental events collected in each of the country over the period The single-index model is a particular case of the market model described above. Where market returns were available, we also obtained results using the market model. Results were similar to those presented here. In fact, Henderson (1990) points out that the three estimating methodologies yield results of similar nature. be more sensitive. In Table 5 and 7, we indicate the nature of events for which statistically significant increases or reductions in market values are observed.
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With respect to positive news, it is of extreme interest to note in Table 5 Complete statistical results are presented in Appendix 2 and 3. Where the length of estimation period is too short, we combine days prior to the event window with post event period starting 30 days after the event window. The treatment plant will start working from March 15. Self impact assessment of environment. 9/14/91
Company action: implementation of reforestation project.
6/8/93
Announcement: new waste water treatment plant.
As indicated in Section 3, it is possible to pool together events and test for the statistical significance of the average abnormal return for the events thus pooled. Given the nature of the results on individual stock markets, it is of interest to test if government actions (e.g. agreements and awards) as a whole are statistically significant. In Table 6 , we have grouped together these government actions and treated them as a single set of events. As can be observed, government actions as a whole are mildly statistically significant on day +1. However, the difference between government actions and other positive events fail to be statistically significant. This may be explained by noting in Table   5 that 3 individual government actions failed to be statistically significant. (-0.115) These results give some support to public information programs whereby the regulator rates and releases not only bad environmental performance but also superior performance. The results indicate that such recognition does not solely limit itself to an increase in reputation but also has a positive financial impact on the firm (through an expected increase in demand brought about by the enhanced reputation, or reduction in expected costs, e.g. lesser scrutiny by environmental groups, communities, and regulators).
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14 In Argentina: Indupa (2/7/93). In Chile: Emos (8/11/93) and Molymet (10/11/93). In these last two events, it was announced that the President of Chile would inaugurate a plant (as opposed to approving an investment or agreement).
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For Government actions and All other positive events, the sampled aggregate abnormal return (AAR) is computed for day -1, 0, and +1. The average cumulative abnormal return (CAAR) is computed for day -10 up to the day. For the event window, the average cumulative abnormal return is calculated over the period -10 to +10. Within brackets is the value of the Z statistics. For Government actions Vs All other positive events, the AAR is here defined as the difference between the AAR for Government actions and the AAR for All other positive events. The Z statistics is defined accordingly. "•", "*", and "**" means significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively (one tailed-test).
With respect to negative events (Table 7) , we obtain statistically significant decreases in market values especially when it is reported that governments or citizens have complained about the pollution record of the firm, and not when court actions or fines are reported. Government action: fine.
Given the nature of these results, we have pooled together government and citizens' complaints and tested whether or not they had a statistically significant differential impact on market values when compared to all other negative events. Results in Table 8 indicate that they strongly do. enforcement of regulations should be abandoned and that markets (firms, consumers, communities) be left to themselves to negotiate and induce pollution abatement from polluters (not all firms may be responsive to public release of their environmental performance), these results suggest that in numerous circumstances market forces (even in developing countries) have not remained idle upon receiving signals of the environmental performance of firms. These results indicate that at the margin, environmental regulators should devote less resources to the enforcement of regulations, and more to the collection, analysis, and dissemination of appropriate, reliable, and timely information. Further research in this area will indicate whether or not our findings can be generalised, as well as providing a greater understanding of the mechanisms which underpin the reaction of capital markets.
Moreover, whether or not firms have "voluntarily" undertaken pollution abatement activities seeking the obtention of the reward, and whether or not adverse market reaction has lead firms to subsequently invest in pollution control is a further issue of investigation. 18 It is indeed currently beyond the realm of our possibilities to comprehensively address this issue as it requires a vast amount of firm-level data that is not currently available for the countries studied here. From an anecdotal point of view however, it is interesting to note, among others, that after Chilgener (Chile) had released a cloud of toxic air pollution over Santiago and suffered a loss of 5% of its market value in 18 Konar and Cohen (1997) have shown that firms that have suffered the largest reduction in market value following the release of the TRI in 1989 have subsequently invested most in pollution abatement.
April 1992, it announced on September 25 1992, an investment of 115 million dollars to control air pollution. (-0.019) (-0.219) -0.107 -4 .141 (-0.019) (-0.216) -9 .660 (-0.389) Jolibee 6/28/94 0.032 -9.049 (0.010) (-0.910) 0.032 -9.017 (0.010) (-0.868) 4.032 • -4 .985 (1.282) (-0 (-0.373 ) (-0.221) 1.127 -1.417 (0.303) (-0.120) -0.139 -1.617 (-0.037) (-0.125) -5.332 (-0.397) 
Appendix 1 Complete name of companies in sample set
